SA 4705. Mr. LEE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

SEC. 1064. DECLASSIFICATION OF HISTORICAL FISA DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND OPINIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 602 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1872) shall apply with respect to decisions, orders, and opinions by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as such terms are defined in section 601(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1871(e))) that were issued before, on, or after the date of enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–23; 129 Stat. 268).

(b) DEADLINE.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete the review required under section 602 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1872) with respect to, and make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable in accordance with such section, each decision, order, and opinion described in subsection (a) of this section that was issued before the date of enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–23; 129 Stat. 268).

SA 4706. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XIV, add the following:

Subtitle D—Extraction and Processing of Defense Minerals in the United States

SEC. 1431. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ''Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths and Critical Minerals Act of 2021'' or the ''REEShore Critical Minerals Act of 2021''.

SEC. 1432. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Natural Resources, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) CRITICAL MINERAL.—The term ''critical mineral'' has the meaning given that term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (division Z of Public Law 116–260; 30 U.S.C. 1606(a)).

(3) DEFENSE MINERAL PRODUCT.—The term ''defense mineral product'' means any product—

(A) formed or comprised of, or manufactured from, one or more critical minerals; and

(B) used in critical military defense technologies or other related applications of the Department of Defense.

(4) PROCESSED OR REFINED.—The term ''processed or refined'' means any process by which a defense mineral is extracted, separated, or otherwise manipulated to render the mineral usable for manufacturing a defense mineral product.

SEC. 1433. REPORT ON STRATEGIC CRITICAL MINERAL AND DEFENSE MINERAL PRODUCTS RESERVE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the storage of substantial quantities of critical minerals and defense mineral products will—

(1) diminish the vulnerability of the United States to the effects of a severe supply chain interruption; and

(2) provide limited protection from the short-term consequences of an interruption in supplies of defense mineral products.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, in procuring critical minerals and defense mineral products, the Secretary of Defense should prioritize procurement of critical minerals and defense mineral products from sources in the United States, including that are mined, produced, separated, and manufactured within the United States.

(c) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the United States Geologic Survey, and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(A) describing the existing authorities and funding levels of the Federal Government to stockpile critical minerals and defense mineral products;

(B) assessing whether those authorities and funding levels are sufficient to meet the requirements of the United States; and

(C) including recommendations to diminish the vulnerability of the United States to disruptions in the supply chains for critical minerals and defense mineral products through changes to policy, procurement regulation, or existing law, including any additional statutory authorities that may be needed.

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Director of National Intelligence shall take into consideration the needs of the Armed Forces of the United States, the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))), the defense industrial and technology sectors, and any places, organizations, physical infrastructure, or digital infrastructure designated as critical to the national security of the United States.

SEC. 1434. REPORT ON DISCLOSURES CONCERNING CRITICAL MINERALS BY CONTRACTORS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than December 31, 2022, the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Interior, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(1) a review of the existing disclosure requirements with respect to the provenance of magnets used within defense mineral products;

(2) a review of the feasibility of imposing a requirement that any contractor of the Department of Defense provide a disclosure with respect to any system with a defense mineral product that is a permanent magnet, including an identification of the country or countries in which—

(A) the critical minerals used in the magnet were mined;

(B) the critical minerals were refined into oxides;

(C) the critical minerals were made into metals and alloys; and

(D) the magnet was sintered or bonded and magnetized; and

(3) recommendations to Congress for implementing such a requirement, including methods to ensure that any tracking or provenance system is independently verifiable.

SEC. 1435. REPORT ON PROHIBITION ON ACQUISITION OF DEFENSE MATERIALS FROM NON-ALLIED FOREIGN NATIONS.

The Secretary of Defense shall study and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the potential impacts of imposing a restriction that, for any contract entered into or renewed on or after December 31, 2026, for the procurement of a system the export of which is restricted or controlled under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), no critical minerals processed or refined in the People's Republic of China may be included in the system.

SEC. 1436. PRODUCTION IN AND USES OF CRITICAL MINERALS BY UNITED STATES ALLIES.

(a) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage countries that are allies of the United States to eliminate their dependence on non-allied countries for critical minerals to the maximum extent practicable.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than December 31, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(1) describing in detail the discussions of such Secretaries with countries that are allies of the United States concerning supply chain security for critical minerals;

(2) assessing the likelihood of those countries discontinuing the use of critical minerals from foreign entities of concern (as defined in section 9901(6) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651(6))) or countries that such Secretaries deem to be of concern; and

(3) assessing initiatives in other countries to increase critical mineral mining and production capabilities.

SA 4707. Mr. WHITEHOUSE (for himself and Ms. HASSAN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. ____. INCREASING THE CAPACITY OF STATES AND PARTNER COUNTRIES TO COUNTER CORRUPTION AND MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEMES RELATED TO DRUG TRAFFICKING.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ''Not Allowing Revenue for Criminal Organizations Act'' or ''NARCO Act''.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations prey upon individuals suffering from substance use disorders and exploit the financial systems of the United States to sustain their criminal enterprises.

(2) The illicit drug trade in the United States is conservatively valued at $150,000,000,000 annually, making it worth more than the gross domestic product of approximately 150 countries.

(3) More than 93,000 individuals in the United States died from drug overdoses in 2020.

(4) Drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations perpetuate crime, corruption, and kleptocracy, which undermines the rule of law and erodes democratic institutions in foreign countries while threatening the national security of the United States.

(5) Understanding and attacking the financial networks, both in the United States and abroad, that enable drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations is critical to disrupting and dismantling those organizations.

(6) As such, the national drug control strategy of the United States should include an explicit focus, goals, and metrics related to mapping, tracking, attacking, and dismantling the financial networks of drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations.

(7) Uniform application of anti-money laundering laws and information sharing will enhance the ability of the Federal Government and State governments to dismantle drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations.

(8) The Financial Action Task Force establishes international standards that aim to prevent money laundering associated with the illicit drug trade and other illegal activities, and is supported by more than 200 implementing countries and jurisdictions, including the United States. In its 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report of the United States, the Task Force found that while Federal law enforcement agencies aggressively target money laundering cases, ''State law enforcement authorities can complement Federal efforts, but more typically pursue State-level law enforcement priorities. Among the States, there is no uniform approach and little data is available. Where information was provided, it tended to suggest that [money laundering] is not prioritised by the State authorities.''.

(9) It is in the best national security interest of the United States to increase the capacity of States and partner countries to identify, investigate, and prosecute corruption and money laundering schemes that directly benefit drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations.

(c) GAO REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Caucus on International Narcotics Control of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy an assessment of—

(A) the number and status of investigations and prosecutions across National Drug Control Program agencies (as defined in section 702 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1701)) with a drug trafficking and money laundering and illicit finance nexus, unless the disclosure of such information would reveal information protected by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a court order; and

(B) the amount of money and other things of value in various forms, including tangible and digital assets, and property criminally seized by or forfeited to the Federal Government on an annual basis from individuals associated with drug trafficking, drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, or money laundering organizations, which shall be—

(i) adjusted to eliminate duplication in the case of seizures or forfeitures carried out and reported by multiple agencies; and

(ii) disaggregated by agency.

(2) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—The Comptroller General may provide the assessment under paragraph (1), or a portion thereof, in a classified annex if necessary.

(d) TECHNICAL UPDATES TO OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1998.—

(1) DEFINITION OF ''SUPPLY REDUCTION''.—Section 702(17) of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1701(17)) is amended—

(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (G) and (H) as subparagraphs (H) and (I), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:

''(G) activities to map, track, dismantle, and disrupt the financial networks of drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and money laundering organizations involved in the manufacture and trafficking of drugs in the United States and in foreign countries;''.

(2) CONTENTS OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY.—Section 706(c)(1)(L) of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1705(c)(1)(L)) is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: '', which statistical data shall include, to the greatest extent practicable, the information submitted to the Director by the Comptroller General of the United States in the 2 most recent annual reports under subsection (c) of the Not Allowing Revenue for Criminal Organizations Act''.

(e) MODEL LAWS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall enter into an agreement with a nongovernmental organization, which may include an institution of higher education, to—

(A) advise States on establishing laws and policies to address money laundering practices related to the manufacture, sale, or trafficking of illicit drugs;

(B) develop model State laws pertaining to money laundering practices related to the sale or trafficking of illicit drugs; and

(C) revise the model State laws described in subparagraph (B) and draft supplementary model State laws that take into consideration changes in the trafficking of illicit drugs and related money laundering schemes in the State involved.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $300,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this subsection.

(f) COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT FINANCE TECHNIQUES USED BY CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury, shall provide training, technical assistance, and mentorship, through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, to foreign countries that have been designated as major money laundering countries under section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h) in order to—

(A) increase the institutional capacity of those countries to prevent corruption and swiftly address corruption when it occurs;

(B) implement justice sector reform to ensure the successful prosecution of drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, money laundering organizations, and other entities or individuals involved in the illicit drug trade;

(C) better understand, map, target, and attack the financial networks of drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, and other entities or individuals involved in the illicit drug trade;

(D) develop and implement laws and regulations to establish or strengthen asset forfeiture programs; and

(E) develop and implement laws and regulations to counter corruption, money laundering, and illicit finance techniques used by drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, money laundering organizations, and other entities or individuals involved in the illicit drug trade.

(2) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2023, the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Caucus on International Narcotics Control of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that includes, with respect to each country that received training, technical assistance, and mentorship under paragraph (1) during that fiscal year—

(A) the type and duration of training, technical assistance, and mentorship provided to the country;

(B) the implementation status of new laws and regulations to counter corruption, money laundering, and illicit finance techniques used by drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, money laundering organizations, and other entities or individuals involved in the illicit drug trade in the country;

(C) the number of money laundering and illicit finance investigations, prosecutions, and convictions related to the narcotics trade that were undertaken in the country;

(D) the amount of money and other things of value in various forms, including tangible and digital assets, and property criminally seized by or forfeited to the Federal Government from drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations, money laundering organizations, and other entities or individuals involved in the illicit drug trade, in the country; and

(E) the number of joint investigations that United States undertook with the country and whether those investigations led to prosecutions or convictions.

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $80,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this subsection.

SA 4708. Mr. WHITEHOUSE (for himself and Mr. GRASSLEY) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1216. ESTABLISHMENT OF AFGHAN WORKING GROUP AND AFGHAN THREAT FINANCE CELL.

(a) AFGHAN WORKING GROUP.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency organization to be known as the ''Afghan Working Group''.

(2) MISSION.—The mission of the Afghan Working Group shall be—

(A) to reduce the manufacture, sale, and distribution of illicit narcotics from Afghanistan;

(B) to identify, disrupt, and eliminate illicit financial networks in Afghanistan, particularly—

(i) such networks involved in narcotics trafficking, illicit financial transactions (including through the use of domestic and international professional money launderers), and official corruption; and

(ii) terrorist networks; and

(C) to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan.

(3) MEMBERSHIP.—The Afghan Working Group shall be convened by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and consist of representatives from the following agencies:

(A) The Department of the Treasury.

(B) The Department of Justice.

(C) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

(D) The Department of State.

(E) The Department of Defense.

(F) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(G) The Internal Revenue Service.

(H) The Department of Homeland Security.

(I) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(J) The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(K) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(L) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of Treasury.

(M) The Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs.

(N) The Office of National Drug Control Policy.

(O) Any other law enforcement agency or element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs considers appropriate.

(4) COORDINATION.—The Afghan Working Group shall regularly coordinate and consult with regional anti-corruption bodies, financial intelligence units, the international Financial Action Task Force, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

(5) BRIEFINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Afghan Working Group shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the activities of the Afghan Working Group.

(B) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:

(i) An assessment of the activities undertaken by, and the effectiveness of, the Afghan Working Group with respect to—

(I) reducing the manufacture, sale, and distribution of illicit narcotics from Afghanistan;

(II) identifying, disrupting, and eliminating illicit financial networks in Afghanistan, particularly—

(aa) such networks involved in narcotics trafficking, illicit financial transactions (including through the use of domestic and international professional money launderers), and official corruption; and

(bb) terrorist networks; and

(III) promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan.

(ii) Recommendations to Congress on legislative or regulatory improvements necessary to support the efforts described in subclauses (I) through (III) of clause (i).

(C) FORM.—A briefing under subparagraph (A) may be provided in classified form.

(b) AFGHAN THREAT FINANCE CELL.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Afghan Working Group is established, the Afghan Working Group shall establish an interagency organization to be known as the ''Afghan Threat Finance Cell''.

(2) MISSION.—The mission of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell shall be to identify, disrupt, and eliminate illicit financial networks in Afghanistan, particularly—

(A) such networks involved in narcotics trafficking, illicit financial transactions (including through the use of domestic and international professional money launderers), and official corruption; and

(B) terrorist networks.

(3) LEAD AGENCIES.—The Department of the Treasury shall serve as the lead agency of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, and the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of Defense shall serve as the co-deputy lead agencies of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell.

(4) COORDINATION.—The Afghan Threat Finance Cell shall regularly coordinate and consult with regional financial intelligence units, the international Financial Action Task Force, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

(5) BRIEFINGS.—

(A) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Afghan Threat Finance Cell shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the activities of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell.

(B) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:

(i) An assessment of the activities undertaken by, and the effectiveness of, the Afghan Threat Finance Cell in identifying, disrupting, and eliminating illicit financial networks in Afghanistan, particularly—

(I) such networks involved in narcotics trafficking, illicit financial transactions, (including through the use of domestic and international professional money launderers), and official corruption; and

(II) terrorist networks.

(ii) Recommendations to Congress on legislative or regulatory improvements necessary to support the identification, disruption, and elimination of illicit financial networks in Afghanistan.

(C) FORM.—A briefing under subparagraph (A) may be provided in classified form.

(c) TERMINATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Afghan Working Group and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell shall terminate on the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EXTENSION.—The President may extend the termination date under paragraph (1) for the Afghan Working Group, the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, or both, as necessary.

(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, the term ''appropriate committees of Congress'' means—

(1) The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control; and

(2) The Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Oversight and Reform, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SA 4709. Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself and Mr. SULLIVAN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title X, add the following:

Subtitle H—Foreign Service Families Act of 2021

SECTION 1071. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ''Foreign Service Families Act of 2021''.

SEC. 1072. TELECOMMUTING OPPORTUNITIES.

(a) DETO POLICY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Each Federal department and agency shall establish a policy enumerating the circumstances under which employees may be permitted to temporarily perform work requirements and duties from approved overseas locations where there is a related Foreign Service assignment pursuant to an approved Domestically Employed Teleworking Overseas (DETO) agreement.

(2) PARTICIPATION.—The policy described under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) ensure that telework does not diminish employee performance or agency operations;

(B) require a written agreement that—

(i) is entered into between an agency manager and an employee authorized to telework, that outlines the specific work arrangement that is agreed to; and

(ii) is mandatory in order for any employee to participate in telework;

(C) provide that an employee may not be authorized to telework if the performance of that employee does not comply with the terms of the written agreement between the agency manager and that employee;

(D) except in emergency situations as determined by the head of an agency, not apply to any employee of the agency whose official duties require on at least a monthly basis—

(i) direct handling of secure materials determined to be inappropriate for telework by the agency head; or

(ii) on-site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternate worksite;

(E) be incorporated as part of the continuity of operations plans of the agency in the event of an emergency; and

(F) enumerate the circumstances under which employees may be permitted to temporarily perform work requirements and duties from approved overseas locations.

(b) ACCESS TO ICASS SYSTEM.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall revise chapter 900 of volume 6 of the Foreign